Federalist 10 and 51. Federalist No. 10 2019-02-27

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The Federalist: Summary & Analytics Section II: Advantages of Union Federalist No 10 James Madison

federalist 10 and 51

The Constitution is the best way to ensure that no part of the government, and no part of society, can get too much control over the others. Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other. It also provides for a federal navy that will assist the United States in establishing commercial privileges in this hemisphere. The Text While each Federalist paper was published anonymously, Federalist papers 10 and 51 were most likely written by James Madison, because they mostly deal with things about the government that he introduced. A faction is defined as any number of citizens that are inspired by some common passions to act adversely towards the rights of other citizens. A strong national government would be distant from the people and not capable of protecting the rights of the citizens.

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The Federalist #10 and #51

federalist 10 and 51

Cloonan, The Federalist Papers: A Commentary — The Baton Rouge Lectures New York: Peter Lang, 2000 , 399-429; Melvyn R. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. It is more cost-efficient to run a union government than to support 13 separate governments. Justice is the purpose of government and civil society. The greatest objection against frequent appeals to the people on constitutional questions was that this procedure would not maintain the government's constitutional equilibrium. The Secretary of War would advise the President. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.

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The Federalist #10 and #51

federalist 10 and 51

The Eleventh Pillar: New York State and the Federal Constitution. He also relied heavily on the philosophers of the , especially , whose influence is most clear in Madison's discussion of the types of faction and in his argument for an extended republic. David Epstein, writing in 1984, described it as among the most highly regarded of all American political writing. Perhaps such a plan of constructing the several departments would be less difficult in practice than it may in contemplation appear. In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights.

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Federalist Papers Nos. 10 and 51 by James Madison

federalist 10 and 51

That is why the framers divided the Congress into two branches, the House of Representatives and the Senate, and provided for a different method of election in each branch. Whether or not readers understood Madison or agreed with the Progressives, Federalist No. The Federalist Papers are 85 articles from several New York newspapers that were published during the debate to ratify the United States Constitutuion. In other words, Madison argued that the unequal distribution of property led to the creation of different classes that formed different factions and pursued different class interests. Justice is the end of government. In a representative democracy it is not only important to guard against the oppression of rulers, it is equally important to guard against the injustice which may be inflicted by certain citizens or groups. As Jefferson's Secretary of State 1801-1809 , Madison supervised the Louisiana Purchase, doubling the nation's size, and sponsored the ill-fated Embargo Act of 1807.

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Federalist Papers No. 51

federalist 10 and 51

The Anti-Federalists and Cato both quoted Montesquieu on the issue of the ideal size of a republic, citing his statement in that: It is natural to a republic to have only a small territory, otherwise it cannot long subsist. By enlarging too much the number of electors, you render the representatives too little acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser interests; as by reducing it too much, you render him unduly attached to these, and too little fit to comprehend and pursue great and national objects. The members of each branch should not be too dependent on the members of the other two branches in the determination of their salaries. Hemakes an argument on how this is not possible in a pure democracybut possible in a republic. This makes it very difficult for one group to dominate or threaten the minority groups. To stay independent, their own department must not encroach on the others.

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The Federalist: Summary & Analytics Section II: Advantages of Union Federalist No 10 James Madison

federalist 10 and 51

It is no less certain than it is important, notwithstanding the contrary opinions which have been entertained, that the larger the society, provided it lie within a practical sphere, the more duly capable it will be of self-government. Shall domestic manufactures be encouraged, and in what degree, by restrictions on foreign manufactures? In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights. The best security against a gradual concentration of power in any one branch is to provide constitutional safeguards that would make such concentration difficult. You guessed it, it was you my friend. The last argument Madison makes in favor of a large republic is, ina small republic there will be a lower variety of interests andparties, so more frequently a majority will be found.

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What are the differences between Federalists papers No 51 and 10

federalist 10 and 51

Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors,. If government allows or encourages strong groups to combine together against the weak, liberty will be lost and anarchy will result. Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of government, have erroneously supposed that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their passions. Frequent appeals to the people were not a proper or effective way of keeping the three main governmental departments within their prescribed constitutional limits. There aretwo ways again of removing its causes, one is by taking awayliberty, the other is by giving the same interests to everycitizens.

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The Federalist #10

federalist 10 and 51

We see it particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power, where the constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other that the private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the public rights. Also, in a republic, the delegates both filter and refine the many demands of the people so as to prevent the type of frivolous claims that impede purely democratic governments. The Legislative branch needs to be split further into the House of Representatives and the Senate because it's the most powerful branch, and members of the Judicial branch need to be chosen by the President with the Senate's approval because they want qualified candidates for a position that lasts for life. But it is not possible to give to each department an equal power of self-defense. One such was a rational fear that a central government's president might be thought of as a King; whom they had just fought a revolutionary war against.


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Federalist Papers #10 and #51

federalist 10 and 51

The interests of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. According to Adair, Beard reads No. But the framers recognized certain practical difficulties in making every office elective. Without presuming to undertake a full development of this important idea, I will hazard a few general observations, which may perhaps place it in a clearer light, and enable us to form a more correct judgment of the principles and structure of the government planned by the convention. However, he was equally concerned about the greater risk of tyranny of the majority. The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution.

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Analysis of Federalist #51

federalist 10 and 51

As the weight of the legislative authority requires that it should be thus divided, the weakness of the executive may require, on the other hand, that it should be fortified. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert result from the form of government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual. The first method prevails in all governments possessing an hereditary or self-appointed authority. They wanted a republic diverse enough to prevent faction but with enough commonality to maintain cohesion among the states. Eventually the less-popular Federalists lost their power and for a period of time America had a one-party system within the Anti-Federalist party called the Democrat Republicans.

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